Function prototype and description for gets() [ISO C99, 2005] Function Prototype in Java

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Table 61 Function prototype and description for gets() [ISO C99, 2005] Function Prototype
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char gets(char *s)
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Description The gets function reads characters from the input stream pointed to by stdin into the array pointed to by s, until end-of- le is encountered or a newline character is read
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6 Buffer Over ow
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The rst widely publicized buffer over ow exploit was written against a vulnerability in the Berkeley ngerd daemon The Morris Worm leveraged the exploit to help it wreak havoc on the then-infantine Internet (approximately 60,000 computers) The worm caused some machines to become unavailable due to the worm s load and others to be pulled off the network to avoid infection The vulnerable code in ngerd came down to one thing: a call to gets(), as shown in Example 610 The code was used to read data from a socket connection, which meant that anyone who could open a connection to ngerd could exploit the vulnerability Clearly, gets() need not always be used to read network data, so not every call to the function presents the potential for a remote exploit However, a call to gets() does mean that the security of your program depends on it receiving only well-intentioned input
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Example 610 An unsafe call to gets() similar to the one exploited by the Morris worm
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char line[512]; gets(line);
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C++ rst appeared 12 years after C, but it repeated many of the same mistakes At best, C++ could have been as safe as C because it is (mostly) backward compatible, so it supports the same constructs and libraries as its predecessor However, despite the opportunity to learn from past mistakes, the designers of C++ replicated some of the same blatant vulnerabilities that exist in C Among the most obvious examples is the reproduction of the faulty behavior of gets() with the de nition of the operator >> for reading into a character array The behavior is almost identical to the behavior of gets() The C++ code shown in Example 611 is functionally equivalent to the code from fingerd in Example 610
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Example 611 An unsafe use of the C++ operator >>
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char line[512]; cin >> (line);
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scanf() and Friends
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Although slightly more complex than gets(), scanf() is vulnerable in much the same way because it is designed to read an arbitrary amount of formatted data into one or more fixed-size buffers When scanf() encounters a %s
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Strings
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speci er in its format string, it reads characters into the corresponding buffer until a non-ASCII value is encountered, potentially resulting in a buffer overflow if the function is supplied with more data than the buffer can accommodate If a width specifier is included, such as %255s, scanf() will read up to the specified number of characters into the buffer Because of the capability to limit the amount of input read, scanf() can potentially be used safely if the format specifier properly bounds the amount of data read Even when it is used, correct bounds enforcement through format string speci ers is error prone Functions that mimic the behavior of scanf(), such as fscanf() and wscanf(), are equally dangerous Table 62 summarizes the scanf() class of functions
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Table 62 Function prototype and description for scanf() [ISO C99, 2005] Function Prototype
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int scanf(const char *FORMAT [, ARG, ])
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Description The scanf() function reads input from stdin, under control of the string pointed to by format that speci es the admissible input sequences and how they are to be converted for assignment, using subsequent arguments as pointers to the objects to receive the converted input
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The code in Example 612 is from Version 2011 of the w3-msql CGI program, which provides a lightweight Web interface for Mini-SQL [Zhodiac, 1999] Because buffer is allocated to hold 15 1,024 bytes, an attacker can use the unbounded call to scanf() to ll it with a large amount of malicious code before the buffer over ows, which makes the exploit easier Ironically, the code ignores the value used in the exploit; it is read only to advance the input source This vulnerability has been remotely exploited to gain root privileges
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Example 612 Code from w3-msql 2011 that is vulnerable to a remote buffer over ow caused by an unsafe call to scanf()
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char var[128], val[15 * 1024], , boundary[128], buffer[15 * 1024]; for(;;) { // if the variable is followed by '; filename="name"' it is a file inChar = getchar(); if (inChar == ';') { // scan in the content type if present, but simply ignore it scanf(" Content-Type: %s ", buffer);
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