Biometric Encryption: The New Breed of Untraceable Biometrics in .NET

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Biometric Encryption: The New Breed of Untraceable Biometrics
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to a stored template and/or to the algorithm, the security of a biometric system diminishes. On the other hand, BE offers a certain level of security even in a nontrusted environment, with the addition of greatly enhanced privacy bene ts. Instead of applying a cryptographic yardstick to BE, we view it along the lines of a key management scheme, or a stronger replacement for conventional passwords. Passwords do not possess, in general, cryptographic security, because they can be broken with a dictionary attack, and so on. For a BE system, nothing would prevent the same protection measures (i.e., hardware and procedures) from being implemented, as presently used in conventional biometrics. For example, storing helper data on a smart card, or even running the whole BE algorithm on card, would add an additional layer of security. Even more, those measures may be applied in a manner that is unique to BE. For example, using a password to recreate, on-the- y, some part of the helper data would integrate the biometric and the knowledge-based approaches at a more fundamental level. The password/token can control part of the helper data: For example, a permutation table [31], a transform of a minutiae [90] or a face [94] template will be regenerated onthe- y each time. This is similar to the CB approach, where a secret transform is controlled by the password or token and, in a way, is a merger of BE and CB (see also discussion in reference 139). Thus, the password/token may become an essential part of the BE process on a fundamental level. While such a system would not offer full cryptographic security, it could be more secure than either a conventional biometric system or a password-based system, or even two-tier authentication involving password/token and conventional biometrics. If BE is used within a framework of a homomorphic cryptosystem [142], it will allow biometric authentication in the encrypted domain (see Case Scenario 5 in Section 26.7 for more details). This would provide an ultimate solution to most BE security issues.
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PRIVACY AND SECURITY ADVANTAGES OF BE
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In the following subsections, we consider several BE case scenarios (see also reference 3) which demonstrate the great potential of BE technologies as a tool that enhances both privacy and security. Note that CB technologies are less suitable or not suitable at all for these scenarios, since CB outputs a binary Yes/No response instead of a key.
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Case Scenarios
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Biometric Ticketing
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A promising BE application is one-time-use biometric tickets or tokens, for events, boarding passes, and so on. A BE template (i.e., helper data) can be stored on a ticket as a 2D bar code, and a database stores the hashed value of a key for each enrolled user.
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26.7 Privacy and Security Advantages of BE
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The key and the ticket are used only for this particular application. On a veri cation terminal: (a) The user presents her ticket to the system which reads the BE template from the bar code. (b) The live biometric sample is taken. (c) The system applies the biometric to the BE template to retrieve the key. (d) The hashed key is sent to the database where it is compared to the stored version. Notably, the database does not store biometric information or even helper data. The hashed version of the key is secure and meaningless for anything but one-time authentication of the user, such that it can be sent through unsecured channels. The ticket is disposed after its use. If BE has a secret transform, it can be also stored in the database and sent to the veri cation terminal when the user presents the ticket. This would signi cantly increase the security level of the system. With conventional biometrics, the danger of such a one-time-use system is that the person s biometrics could be lost or stolen and later used by thieves to access more secure applications for example, a bank account. The consequences of biometric identity theft are signi cant since the conventional biometric template is nonrevocable. BE also reduces the risk of linkage when the same biometrics are used in multiple applications. 26.7.1.2 Remote Authentication (Challenge Response Scheme) The following case illustrating biometric authentication (remote or local) with thirdparty certi cation is a simpli ed description from Boyen s paper [68] (see also reference 3). Suppose that Alice wishes to authenticate herself to Bob using biometrics. Due to privacy concerns, she does not wish to reveal any biometric information to Bob. We assume that there is a third party, Trent (often called the Trusted Authority), whom Bob trusts to honestly certify Alice s biometrics, and to whom Alice will temporarily grant access to her biometrics for the purpose of generating such a certi cate. Alice will want to be able to obtain as many or as few of those certi cates as she wants, and to reuse as many of them with multiple Bobs, some of whom may even be dishonest, without fear of privacy leaks or impersonation. Enrollment and certi cation takes place under Trent s supervision and using Alice s own biometric. Alice s PIN, which is bound to her biometric, is used to generate a pair of public and private keys. On veri cation, Bob veri es Alice using a challenge/response scheme, such that Alice signs a random challenge (sent by Bob) with her private key, which is obtained from her live biometric applied to the BE template. The protocol [68] does not require Alice to remember or store her PIN or her private key. The BE template may be stored on a smart card or in Alice s laptop that also has a biometric sensor. For different applications ( multiple Bobs ), a new pair
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