GENERIC ATTACKS AGAINST ROUTING in .NET

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47 GENERIC ATTACKS AGAINST ROUTING
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Figure 430 Wormhole attacks (out-of-band channel)
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intent, but malicious nodes could use this attack to undermine the correct operation of various protocols in ad hoc networks The most important protocol that is impacted is the routing protocol, as we can see from the examples given earlier Data aggregation, protocols that depend on location information, data delivery, and so on, are some other examples of services that can be impacted Note that the wormhole attack can be successful even without access to any cryptographic material on the nodes For example, in the above gures (Figures 429 and 430), the wormhole attack can be successful even without knowledge of the keys used by the valid nodes in the system (such as nodes A and B) In addition, nodes in the network do not have to be compromised Thus, in the same gures, node X and node Y could be outsider nodes which are not part of the regular network There have been some proposals recently to protect networks from wormhole attacks by detecting such attacks [71 73] In [71], the authors introduce the concept of leashes to detect wormhole attacks A leash is any information added to a packet in order to restrict the distance that the packet is allowed to travel A leash is associated with each hop Thus, each transmission of a packet requires a new leash Two types of leashes are considered, namely geographical leashes and temporal leashes A geographical leash is intended to limit the distance between the transmitter and the receiver of a packet A temporal leash provides an upper bound on the lifetime of a packet As a result, the packet can only travel a limited distance A receiver of the packet can use these leashes to check if the packet has traveled farther than the leash allows and if so can drop the packet When using geographic leashes, a node is expected to know its own location Each node transmitting a packet will include its own location in the packet and also the time at which the packet is transmitted The node receiving this packet uses this information (about location and time) to calculate if the packet has traveled more than the allowable distance and if so the packet is dropped With temporal leashes, each node transmitting a packet includes the time at which the packet was sent The receiving node notes the time at which the packet was received and uses this to infer if the packet has traveled too far In an alternate formulation, a packet can contain the expiration time after which a receiver should not accept the packet The transmitter node decides on this expiration time as an offset from the time of transmission Note that in both these cases, geographical leashes and temporal leashes, the receiver needs to authenticate the information about the location and time included by a transmitter in the packet This authentication can be achieved by a mechanism such as a digital signature
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SECURE ROUTING
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Geographic leashes require loose time synchronization among the nodes in the network, as opposed to temporal leashes, where the nodes in the network need to have tightly synchronized clocks with nanosecond precision In addition, temporal leashes might not be practical in networks (such as those based on the use of 80211) that make use of a contention-based MAC protocol Temporal leashes will also be effective only against the rst and easier mode of tunneling, where a packet is encapsulated Of course, nodes in systems dependent on geographic leashes need to be able to determine their locations securely (see 7) Another approach for detecting wormhole attacks is given in [72] In this case the authors assume the presence of directional antennae The approach here is based on the use of packet arrival direction to detect that packets are arriving from the proper neighbors Such information is possible due to the use of directional antennae This information about the direction of packet arrival is expected to lead to accurate information about the set of neighbors of a node As a result, wormhole attacks can be detected since such attacks emanate from false neighbors To illustrate this idea consider Figure 431 Here we show two nodes, A and B We show the directional antenna with six zones explicitly for both nodes Each node is assumed to have knowledge of the zone from where a packet is received Given this, the basic idea that is used to determine the set of authentic neighbors is that, if a node is in a given direction of another node, then the latter node is in the opposite direction of the former node For example, in Figure 431, node B is in zone 6 of node A while node A is in the opposite zone, which is zone 3 of node B An implicit assumption here is that the directional antennae on the various nodes are perfectly aligned Now consider nodes A, B, C, D, and E as shown in Figure 432 Assume that B transmits a message (call it a Hello message for simplicity) in its neighborhood which includes C Then node C replies back to B informing node B of the zone from which node B s hello message was received If node B receives this reply in the opposite zone to what zone C reports, then node C can possibly be an authentic neighbor Thus, in this case node C replies back to node B that the hello message was received in zone 1 of node C This reply is received by node B in its zone 4, which is the zone opposite to zone 1 Thus, B can infer that node C is an authentic neighbor Every node can repeat this and form the list of authentic neighbors Any message that does not emanate from an authentic neighbor is rejected
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